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FORGING A PATH TOWARDS MEANINGFUL
DIGITAL PRIVACY: DATA MONETIZATION
AND THE CCPA
Rebecca Harris*
The California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) was passed in
response to a number of newsworthy data breaches with widespread
impacts, and which revealed how little digital privacy consumers
actually have. Despite the large market for consumer data, individual
consumers generally do not earn money when their personal data are
sold. Further, consumers have very little control over who collects their
data, what information is collected, and with whom it is shared. To place
control back in the hands of the consumer, affirmative consent should be
required to collect and sell consumer’s data, and consumers should have
the ability to sell these data themselves.
The CCPA provides a mechanism for consumers to monetize their
own data, but it does not go far enough. The CCPA allows consumers to
“opt-out” of sharing their data, but an “opt-in” framework would offer
increased privacy and greater incentives for companies to pay
consumers for their data. Despite these and many other issues, the CCPA
represents a step towards improved digital privacy. However, it remains
to be seen whether the CCPA will result in any meaningful change to
consumer data monetization and digital privacy protection more
broadly.

* J.D. Candidate, May 2021, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.S., Biology, University
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I. INTRODUCTION
Everyday interactions with technology generate valuable
consumer data, which are sold to be used in advertising, analytics, and
for many other purposes. The demand for consumer data has driven
the growth of the data economy, which in 2018, had an estimated value
exceeding $200 billion.1 Although consumer data drive the data
economy, under the current infrastructure, individual users neither
earn money from the data they generate, nor do they have meaningful
control over how their data are used.2 Further, those companies that
collect and profit from consumer data often fail to exercise even the
most basic cybersecurity measures that are necessary to keep
consumer data safe.3 As a result, consumer information is often poorly
protected, even though it is a valuable commodity. These issues raise
the question of whether consumers should be the ones profiting from
the data they generate and whether this would improve or weaken
consumer data privacy.
Before 2020, California consumers had little, if any, means to
direct companies not to collect and sell their personal data.4 Further,
since there were very few avenues for consumers to sell their personal
data, there was virtually no way for individual consumers to
personally profit from the data marketplace. A new California law has
the potential to address these issues—the California Consumer
Privacy Act (CCPA) provides a mechanism for consumers to exercise
greater control over how their data are used and, potentially, may even
offer an avenue for consumers to monetize their own data.5
The CCPA came into effect on January 1, 2020, and became the
first major data privacy law in the United States.6 The CCPA was first
1. Florian Gröne et al., Tomorrow’s Data Heroes, STRATEGY & BUS. (Feb. 19, 2019),
https://www.strategy-business.com/article/Tomorrows-Data-Heroes.
2. Id.
3. See, e.g., Lily Hay Newman, Equifax Officially Has No Excuse, WIRED (Sept. 14, 2017,
1:27 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/equifax-breach-no-excuse/ (reporting that hackers
exploited a known vulnerability in Equifax’s systems because the company failed to patch and
update its software, despite Equifax’s awareness of its security weakness).
4. Geoffrey A. Fowler, Don’t Sell My Data! We Finally Have a Law for That, WASH. POST
(Feb. 19, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/02/06/ccpa-faq/?arc404=true.
5. Joshua Gutter, Show Me the Money: How the CCPA Provides a Mechanism for Consumers
to Monetize Their Personal Data, JD SUPRA (Aug. 9, 2019), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/
show-me-the-money-how-the-ccpa-provides-94557/.
6. Dimitri Sirota, California’s New Data Privacy Law Brings U.S. Closer to GDPR,
TECH CRUNCH (Nov. 14, 2019, 11:55 AM), https://techcrunch.com/2019/11/14/californias-newdata-privacy-law-brings-u-s-closer-to-gdpr/; see Eric Goldman, An Introduction to the California
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enacted in 2018 as a direct legislative response to the Cambridge
Analytica scandal, which revealed the degree to which consumers
lacked digital privacy and how little control they had over their
personal data.7 As a result, the law was aimed at empowering
consumers to “take back control of [their] personal information.”8 To
accomplish this, the CCPA affords consumers with new rights by
regulating how consumers’ data are handled.9 One of the most
important of these new regulations is that companies must allow
consumers to “opt-out” of selling their data.10 Additionally, the CCPA
quietly includes an option for companies to compensate consumers by
offering financial incentives to sell the consumers’ data.11
Although the CCPA imposes narrow regulations to provide
consumers with greater digital privacy, the new law is expected to
create significant compliance costs for businesses, as well as broad
legal liability.12 The additional expected costs due to the CCPA arise
not only from consumer data handling requirements, but also because
the CCPA creates a limited private cause of action for consumers
whose personal information was exposed in a data breach.13 In light of
the CCPA’s expected added cost to businesses, it is not clear whether
companies will actually exercise the financial incentive section of the
law and compensate consumers for their data.
Additionally, even if consumers have the option to monetize their
own data, this option could be overlooked because consumers are
decision averse and unfamiliar with the provided framework to
exercise this option. Nevertheless, because the CCPA provides a
mechanism for consumers to sell their own data, the CCPA necessarily
affords consumers with some ownership and control over their data
and how that data are used.14 However, there is a possibility that such
a structure, compensating consumers for their data, could actually
Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) 1 (July 1, 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=3211013 (excerpted chapter from ERIC GOLDMAN, INTERNET LAW CASES & MATERIALS
(2019 ed.)) (last updated July 7, 2020) [hereinafter Goldman, An Introduction to the CCPA].
7. S. JUDICIARY COMM., ANALYSIS OF ASSEMBLY BILL NO. 375, 2017–2018 Reg. Sess., at
1 (Cal. 2018).
8. Id. at 3.
9. Id. at 8–14.
10. Id. at 17.
11. CAL. CIV. CODE 1798.125(2)(b)(1) (Deering 2020); see id. § 1798.120.
12. Goldman, An Introduction to the CCPA, supra note 6, at 6.
13. Id.; CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.150(b).
14. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.125(2)(b)(1).
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decrease consumer privacy and potentially frustrate the CCPA’s
overarching goals.15
This Note seeks to address the many uncertainties created by the
CCPA and will explore the new law’s potential impacts, including
how it might lay the foundation for a dramatic change in the market
for consumer data. Part I discusses the current state of data privacy,
including the value of consumer data, data breaches, and a survey of
existing privacy law in the United States and in Europe. Part I also
introduces the CCPA and how it fits into the greater landscape of data
privacy. Part II describes data monetization, how it may be performed,
and how the CCPA creates a framework for consumer data
monetization. This Part also details potential concerns with consumer
data monetization, as well as the CCPA’s general weaknesses. Part III
will briefly conclude by proposing how the CCPA could be improved
to both better facilitate consumers monetizing their own data, and
strengthen consumer data privacy.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. Overview of Personal Data Privacy
The internet is so deeply integrated into people’s lives that in
2019, three in ten Americans reported that they go online daily, and
nearly one-third of those internet users reported they are online
“almost constantly.”16 Behind Americans’ hyper-connectivity lies the
constant collection of user data and personal information. Yet, most
internet users do not know who is collecting their personal data, how
their data are being used, what their data are worth, or even how to
stop sharing them with third parties.17
The terms “personal data,” “consumer data,” and “personal
information” are umbrella terms that can be used interchangeably. The
CCPA broadly defines personal information as “information that
identifies, relates to, describes, [and] is reasonably capable of being
15. Christopher Tonetti & Cameron F. Kerry, Should Consumers Be Able to Sell Their Own
Personal Data?, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 13, 2019, 9:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/shouldconsumers-be-able-to-sell-their-own-personal-data-11570971600.
16. Andrew Perrin & Madhu Kumar, About Three-in-Ten U.S. Adults Say They Are ‘Almost
Constantly’ Online, PEW RSCH. CTR. (July 25, 2019), https://pewrsr.ch/2Y5pwdX (reporting that
81% of Americans go online on a daily basis).
17. Louise Matsakis, The WIRED Guide to Your Personal Data (and Who Is Using It), WIRED
(Feb. 15, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/wired-guide-personal-data-collection.
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associated with . . . a particular consumer or household.”18 This
definition includes specific identifiers, such as name, address, email
address, social security number, internet protocol address, and more.19
For example, the CCPA’s definition of personal information captures
a broad range of commercial data points, including purchasing
tendencies, biometric information, internet browsing history,
geolocation data, and employment-related data.20 The broad definition
of personal information makes it a catch-all term that can be used to
describe essentially any information which could be derived about a
person.21 The term is so broad that personal information even includes
“inferences drawn from any of the information . . . to create a profile
about a consumer reflecting the consumer’s preferences,
characteristics, psychological trends, [etc.]”22
1. Personal Data Collection and Its Value
Internet users generate immense amounts of data in their
everyday interactions with technology, but they typically do not know
that these data are, in fact, a valuable commodity.23 Routine activities,
such as using a search engine or posting on social media, leave behind
a paper trail that reveals intimate details about the user.24 Although
these data contain private details, they are nevertheless sold or
collected by data brokers, who specialize in scraping, selling, and
analyzing consumer data.25
Data brokers gather consumer data from both public and nonpublic sources.26 Public sources of data can include property records,
marriage licenses, and census data.27 In contrast, private sources of
data can include information purchased directly from companies that
interface with consumers.28 Data brokers also purchase consumer data
from other companies, including consumers’ social media
18. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(o)(1).
19. Id. § 1798.140(o)(1)(A).
20. Id. at § 1798.140(o)(1).
21. See id.
22. Id. at § 1798.140(o)(1)(K).
23. Matsakis, supra note 17.
24. Yael Grauer, What Are ‘Data Brokers,’ and Why Are They Scooping Up Information About
You?, VICE (Mar. 27, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/bjpx3w/what-are-databrokers-and-how-to-stop-my-private-data-collection.
25. Id.
26. Matsakis, supra note 17.
27. Grauer, supra note 24.
28. Matsakis, supra note 17.
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connections, credit card transaction data, general web browsing
activity, and geolocation.29 Given that data brokers collect consumer
information from a wide range of sources, they are able to profile
consumers based on their individual demographic, socioeconomic,
psychographic, and physiological data.30 Accordingly, data brokers
hold vast amounts of personal, and often sensitive, information.
Data brokers then sell consumers’ personal information to
advertisers and retailers who analyze the data to gain deeper insight
into consumer habits and to better tailor their targeted advertising to
the individual consumer.31 Although data brokers disidentify
consumer records before selling them to advertisers, reidentifying an
individual from an anonymized data set is relatively straightforward
and easy to accomplish.32 This fact is particularly troubling when
considering anonymized location data sets and the vast amount of
geolocation data that are collected from consumers. Identifying an
individual based on raw, anonymized location data can be quickly
achieved by first looking to where an individual device spent the night
and then cross-referencing this location with public records to reveal
the registered occupant of that home.33 Accordingly, data brokers are
not able to fully mitigate the privacy risks of selling consumer location
data, even if such data are anonymized before sold.
Despite this privacy risk, the market for location data is booming
and sales for location-targeted advertising reached approximately $21
billion in 2018.34 However, consumer data are used for more than just
targeted advertising—retailers use location data to understand where
consumers have been, where they are going, and to influence what
consumers do next.35 Financial firms are even able to use these
location data to inform their investment decisions.36 For example,

29. Id.
30. Anne Logsdon Smith, Alexa, Who Owns My Pillow Talk? Contracting, Collateralizing,
and Monetizing Consumer Privacy Through Voice-Captured Personal Data, 27 CATH. U. J.L. &
TECH. 187, 197 (2018).
31. Jennifer Valentino-DeVries et al., Your Apps Know Where You Were Last Night, and
They’re Not Keeping It Secret, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive
/2018/12/10/business/location-data-privacy-apps.html.
32. Sophie Bushwick, “Anonymous” Data Won’t Protect Your Identity, SCI. AM. (July 23,
2019), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/anonymous-data-wont-protect-your-identity/.
33. Valentino-DeVries et al., supra note 31.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
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location data can provide real-time insights into consumer behavior
and show whether customers are visiting a particular retailer’s stores.37
Although an entire industry was created from selling consumers’
personal information, these consumers are largely left out of the data
economy. Consumers’ data are collected and sold without their
knowledge or consent, and generally, consumers have no say in how
their data are used or handled. Further, consumers are not paid when
their personal information is sold. However, the sale of such data does
return some non-monetary value to consumers in the form of free
services.
This exchange—data for services—resulted from an expectation
built by Silicon Valley that digital services should be free.38 To
monetize free services, companies, such as Google and Facebook,
collect and sell consumers’ personal information for use in targeted
advertising.39 Consumers do receive a benefit from this exchange
because advertising sales allow these companies to provide free
services, such as search, email, and social media platforms.
Additionally, traditional advertising sales, as well as selling consumer
data for use in targeted or “behavioral” advertising, fund much of the
press and other channels of expression, which are struggling to survive
in today’s economy.40
In 2018, companies generated approximately $178 billion in
revenue from collecting and selling their users’ data to enable targeted
advertising.41 However, beyond the use of free services, few users
earned any money from the sale of their personal information.42
Additionally, large-scale leaks and hacks have exposed rampant
privacy abuses—highlighting that the custodians of consumer data
often fail to adequately secure these data, even though they earn
money from selling them to data brokers and advertisers.43 These
37. Id.
38. Imanol Arrieta-Ibarra et al., Should We Treat Data as Labor? Moving Beyond “Free”,
108 AM. ECON. 38, 40–41 (2018).
39. Id. at 41.
40. Jordan Abbott, Time to Build a National Data Broker Registry, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13,
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/13/opinion/data-broker-registry-privacy.html.
41. Gröne et al., supra note 1.
42. Gregory Barber, I Sold My Data for Crypto. Here’s How Much I Made, WIRED (Dec. 17,
2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/i-sold-my-data-for-crypto/ (noting that a data
marketplace app, which enables consumers to sell their data, only had 5,500 sellers).
43. Kari Paul, Americans’ Data Is Worth Billions—and You Soon Might Be Able to Get a Cut
of It, MARKETWATCH (Oct. 9, 2018, 3:05 PM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/americansdata-is-worth-billions-and-you-soon-might-be-able-to-get-a-cut-of-it-2018-10-09.
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privacy issues raise the question of whether consumers would achieve
greater digital privacy if they owned their own data, with the ability to
sell or restrict their use as they see fit.44
2. Overview of Data Breaches
Consumers are particularly vulnerable to security breaches due to
the immense volume of personal data that are collected and held by
companies.45 Data breaches are the inadvertent or unauthorized
exposure of an organization’s sensitive information.46 Sensitive
information can include the personally identifying details of that
organization’s customers or users, such as customers’ social security
number, date of birth, or financial account information.47 These data
can be misused in a number of ways: to file a fraudulent tax return; to
fraudulently redirect a beneficiary’s direct deposit benefits; to apply
for employment; or to rent a home and more.48 However, one of the
most common misuses of personal information is financial fraud in the
form of identity theft.49
New-account fraud is a type of identity theft that occurs when a
fraudster uses someone else’s personally identifiable information to
open new financial accounts without that person’s knowledge.50
However, existing-account fraud is the more frequent type of identity
theft and it involves unauthorized charges or withdrawals of money.51
Identity theft, both as existing and new-account fraud, can continue
for years following a breach because many pieces of identifying

44. Tonetti & Kerry, supra note 15.
45. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-19-230, DATA BREACHES: RANGE OF
CONSUMER RISKS HIGHLIGHTS LIMITATIONS OF IDENTITY THEFT SERVICES 1 (2019) [hereinafter
DATA BREACHES REPORT ].
46. Id. at 1 n.1.
47. Id. at 1.
48. Id. at 4–5.
49. FED. TRADE COMM’N, CONSUMER SENTINEL NETWORK 4 (2020),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/consumer-sentinel-network-data-book2019/consumer_sentinel_network_data_book_2019.pdf [hereinafter CONSUMER SENTINEL
NETWORK REPORT].
50. DATA BREACHES REPORT, supra note 45, at 5.
51. Id.; CONSUMER SENTINEL NETWORK REPORT, supra note 49, at 4 (“Credit card fraud tops
the list of identity theft reports in 2019. The FTC received more than 271,000 reports from people
who said their information was misused on an existing account or to open a new credit card
account.”).

(9) 54.1_HARRIS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

206

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

2/25/21 6:00 PM

[Vol. 54:197

information, such as social security numbers, cannot be changed and
thus can be used repeatedly.52
a. Frequency and consumer impacts
Due to a number of massive and highly publicized data breaches,
consumers are more aware of data privacy than ever before.53 In 2019,
the Pew Research Center reported that approximately 30 percent of
Americans had experienced a data breach in the past twelve months.54
Most Americans also reported concern over how their personal
information is collected and used by companies, likely in part due to
high frequency and wide reach of data breaches.55 Additionally, these
data breaches have caused consumers to lose confidence in an
institution’s ability to protect their data, and in 2019, most Americans
reported that they believed their personal information was less secure
than it was five years prior.56
It is not surprising that Americans lack confidence in their digital
privacy. Given the depth of sensitive information that companies
collect, consumers are especially vulnerable to identity theft when
companies fail to adequately secure these data and are hacked as a
result.57 For example, in 2017, the behemoth credit reporting agency,
Equifax, announced that a breach of their database exposed the
personal data of 143 million American consumers.58 Equifax has
access to the personal financial data of nearly every American adult
because it is one of the three main agencies that calculate consumers’
credit scores.59 As a result of this breach, hackers were able to access

52. KAMALA D. HARRIS, ATT’Y GEN., CAL. DEP’T OF JUST., CALIFORNIA DATA BREACH
REPORT 2012–2015 at 15–16 (2016), https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/dbr/2016-databreach-report.pdf.
53. BROOKE AUXIER ET AL., PEW RSCH. CTR., AMERICANS AND PRIVACY: CONCERNED,
CONFUSED, AND FEELING LACK OF CONTROL OVER THEIR PERSONAL INFORMATION 15,
17 (2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/wp-content/uploads/sites/9/2019/11/PewResearch-Center_PI_2019.11.15_Privacy_FINAL.pdf [PEW RSCH. CTR. REPORT ].
54. Id. at 18.
55. Id. at 20.
56. Id. at 15.
57. Rani Molla, Why Your Free Software Is Never Free, VOX (Jan. 29, 2020, 12:00 PM),
https://www.vox.com/recode/2020/1/29/21111848/free-software-privacy-alternative-data.
58. Lily Hay Newman, How to Protect Yourself from That Massive Equifax Breach, WIRED
(Sept. 7, 2017, 7:34 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/how-to-protect-yourself-from-thatmassive-equifax-breach.
59. Id.
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the social security numbers, birth dates, addresses, and other personal
data of nearly 44 percent of the U.S. population.60
b. Causes
Data breaches occur in nearly every industry and, although they
can be caused by sophisticated cyber-attacks, data breaches are often
due to a business’s failure to follow basic cybersecurity practices.61
For example, malicious cyber-attacks were responsible for nearly half
of the 1,473 data breaches in 2019.62 Data thieves accomplished this
by using malware or hacking to exploit existing security weaknesses
in the targets’ systems in order to gain access to sensitive consumer
records.63 However, the remainder of 2019’s data breaches were not
caused by hackers or malware, but rather, were due to human error
and system glitches.64
Although system glitches and human error are not sophisticated
causes of data breaches, the consequences can be just as significant as
those performed by hackers.65 For example, in May of 2019, a
journalist discovered that the large real estate and title insurance firm,
First American, failed to employ basic and essential security measures
to secure consumer data.66 As a result, the sensitive financial records
of over 885 million consumers were accessible to anyone using the
First American website.67 This gap in security provided easy access to
users’ social security numbers, driver’s license images, bank account
numbers, mortgage and tax receipts, and more.68 Although it is
unknown whether the exposed data were accessed and used for
malicious purposes, it would have been extremely easy to do so and
60. Id.
61. See HARRIS, supra note 52, at iii, 28; Newman, Equifax Officially Has No Excuse, supra
note 3.
62. Identity Theft Resource Center’s Annual End-of-Year Data Breach Report Reveals 17
Percent Increase in Breaches over 2018, IDENTITY THEFT RES. CTR.: BLOG—LATEST NEWS
(Jan. 28, 2020), https://www.idtheftcenter.org/identity-theft-resource-centers-annual-end-of-yeardata-breach-report-reveals-17-percent-increase-in-breaches-over-2018/; Larry Ponemon, What’s
New in the 2019 Cost of a Data Breach Report, SEC. INTEL. (July 23, 2019), https://securityintelli
gence.com/posts/whats-new-in-the-2019-cost-of-a-data-breach-report/.
63. See HARRIS, supra note 52, at iii.
64. Ponemon, supra note 62.
65. Id. See generally HARRIS, supra note 52, at 10, 38 (discussing sophisticated cyber
criminals as the perpetrators of malware and hacking).
66. See Lily Hay Newman, The Biggest Cybersecurity Crises of 2019 So Far, WIRED (July 5,
2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/biggest-cybersecurity-crises-2019-so-far/.
67. Id.
68. Id.
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provided open-access to all of the information necessary to commit
identity theft and fraud.69
Regardless of root cause, most data breaches were relatively
preventable.70 This is because companies frequently employ weak or
insecure software and utilize insufficient access controls.71 A
company’s failure to update its software on a regular basis can
seriously compromise cybersecurity because updates are often issued
to patch security vulnerabilities.72 Such careless information
technology practices have serious consequences.73 Equifax, for
example, had known for months that a software update was required
to patch a security vulnerability, but nevertheless failed to take this
simple, but necessary, step to bolster its security.74 As a result, the
company left millions of individuals’ data exposed for hackers to
access.75
c. Loss following a breach
Although some sensitive information, such as passwords, can be
updated once accessed in a breach, many forms of personally
identifying information, such as social security numbers, are not as
easily altered.76 Consequently, attackers typically use exposed
information right away because credit card information can be
changed soon after a breach.77 As a result, personally identifying
information that cannot be quickly changed is essentially a ticking
69. Id.
70. See generally ONLINE TR. ALL., 2018 CYBER INCIDENT & BREACH TRENDS REPORT 3
(2019), https://www.internetsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/OTA-Incident-BreachTrends-Report_2019.pdf (95% of 2018 breaches could have been prevented).
71. See FAQs, HAVEIBEENPWNED.COM, https://haveibeenpwned.com/FAQs (last visited
Oct. 4, 2020) (Have I Been Pwned aggregates data from large data breaches, allowing individuals
to determine whether their email address and sensitive personal information were released in the
breach). See generally Charlie Warzel, How to Take Back Control from Facebook, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 30, 2019, 8:02 PM), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/30/opinion/facebook-ftcprivacy.html.
72. See Mike Hamilton, Why Software Patches Don’t Fix Everything, FORBES (Aug. 6, 2019,
9:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2019/08/06/why-software-patchesdont-fix-everything/#1db0a8b727d5.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. HARRIS, supra note 52, at 15–16.
77. See Tom Groenfeldt, Credit Card Fraud Is Down, but Account Fraud That Directly Hurts
Consumers Remains High, FORBES (Mar. 18, 2019, 8:05 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/tom
groenfeldt/2019/03/18/credit-card-fraud-is-down-but-account-fraud-which-directly-hurtsconsumers-remains-high/#493dc7820bfc.
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time bomb. This is because account information is often placed for
sale on the dark web soon after it is stolen in a breach and as a result,
is available for criminals to use long after the initial breach.78
After consumers’ personally identifying information is breached,
fraudsters can easily locate all of the required information to perform
new-account identity theft.79 Additionally, fraudsters do not face
significant barriers to committing identity theft because most
organizations maintain basic, if not remedial, methods of verifying
identity.80 The extent of most identity verification involves reviewing
just name, address, date of birth, and social security number—
information which can be quickly obtained once a consumer’s
personal information has been breached.81
Additionally, most merchants rely on just a username and
password to access accounts or to make online purchases and do not
require any multi-factor authentication.82 Data breaches often result in
the release of credential lists, which are collections of email addresses
and passwords. 83 Without multi-factor authentication, all fraudsters
require is the information contained in credential lists, and, as a result,
consumers are at a greater risk of having their accounts improperly
accessed.84 If the breached company did not strongly encrypt user
credentials, criminals can fairly easily crack credential lists to pair the
email address to its plain text password.85 Criminals then take these
password lists from breached merchants and test them against a
different merchant to see if the password still provides criminals
access to the consumer’s account. 86 Thus, multi-factor authentication
is important to preventing identity theft because a criminal can access

78. Kate O’Flaherty, Another 127 Million Records Have Gone on Sale on the Dark Web—
Here’s What You Should Do, FORBES (Feb. 15, 2019, 7:50 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ka
teoflahertyuk/2019/02/15/another-127-million-records-have-gone-on-sale-on-the-dark-web-hereswhat-you-should-do/#7e86e1612293.
79. Groenfeldt, supra note 77.
80. See id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Troy Hunt, Password Reuse, Credential Stuffing and Another Billion Records in Have I
Been Pwned, TROYHUNT.COM (May 5, 2017), https://www.troyhunt.com/password-reusecredential-stuffing-and-another-1-billion-records-in-have-i-been-pwned.
84. See id.
85. See id.
86. Groenfeldt, supra note 77.
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accounts using credential lists obtained from a data breach, especially
if users do not use unique passwords for each merchant website.87
Although identity theft and fraud are exceedingly prevalent,
consumers do have some limited protections for when their data are
breached.88 Financial institutions frequently offer services such as
real-time account notification89 and implement “zero-fraud liability”
policies.90 Additionally, laws limiting consumer liability for existingaccount fraud mitigate much of the harm that victims of identity theft
face.91 Nevertheless, non-reimbursable transactions and secondary
fees, such as overdraft penalties, still place victims of identity theft at
risk of a significant financial loss.92
However, identity theft causes more than financial loss.93 The
exposure of personally identifying information can result in significant
amounts of lost time, emotional distress, and reputational harm.94 This
is because stolen data are often sold and then not used until long after
the initial breach.95 Accordingly, even if victims of data breaches do
not suffer an immediate financial injury, the increased risk of identity
theft results in victim’s suffering opportunity costs due to time spent
mitigating their potential harms.96
B. Existing Data Privacy Legislation and Enforcement
Technology has created a moving target for privacy law in
California and the United States in general. Although there are some
legal protections for citizens’ personal information in very specific
contexts, personal data are not considered an economic asset and thus,
few protections exist.97 Despite the large market for consumer data
and the depth of information that companies collect on consumers,
consumers do not own their own data.98 Further, because the United
87. Id.
88. See id.
89. See id.
90. Daniel J. Solove & Danielle Keats Citron, Risk and Anxiety: A Theory of Data-Breach
Harms, 96 TEX. L. REV. 737, 775 (2018).
91. DATA BREACHES REPORT, supra note 45, at 5 n.11.
92. GIACT, The Changing Landscape of Identity Fraud 3 (2019) (unpublished paper).
93. DATA BREACHES REPORT, supra note 45, at 6.
94. Id.
95. Solove & Citron, supra note 90, at 757.
96. Id. at 758–59.
97. See Jeffrey Ritter & Anna Mayer, Regulating Data as Property: A New Construction for
Moving Forward, 16 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 220, 227 (2018).
98. Id. at 246.
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States lacks meaningful digital privacy legislation that provides
consumers with agency and control over their own data, existing laws
do not establish a framework that could viably support consumers
monetizing their own data.
1. Federal Protections
a. Statutory protections
Prior to the enactment of the CCPA, the United States lacked
comprehensive data privacy legislation, and because of this, “privacy
law in the wider U.S. remain[ed] a complex patchwork of narrowly
tailored federal and state laws.”99 U.S. federal privacy law focuses
only on specific types of data, specific industries, or specific modes of
transmitting such data.100 The resulting body of commercial privacy
law is rife with gaps and ultimately fails to provide meaningful checks
on the collection and sale of consumer data.
Data-specific privacy laws include the Fair Credit Reporting Act
(FCRA) and the Health Information Portability and Accountability
Act (HIPAA).101 The FRCA protects consumer credit information and
limits the ways in which third parties may use this information.102
HIPAA protects medical information and sets security standards, as
well as standards on de-identifying protected data.103
A prominent industry-specific privacy law is the Gramm-LeachBliley Act (GLBA).104 The GLBA is limited to the financial services
industry and requires that such institutions disclose how they share
and safeguard sensitive customer data.105 Additionally, the GLBA
requires that covered financial services entities secure customer data

99. Stuart L. Pardau, The California Consumer Privacy Act: Towards a European-Style
Privacy Regime in the United States?, 23 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 68, 73 (2018).
100. See David A. Hyman & William E. Kovacic, Implementing Privacy Policy: Who Should
Do What?, 29 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1117, 1128 (2019).
101. Theodore Rostow, What Happens When an Acquaintance Buys Your Data?: A New
Privacy Harm in the Age of Data Brokers, 34 YALE J. ON REGUL. 667, 676 (2017); see also 15
U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681x (2018) (FCRA); Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.,
29 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C., and 45 C.F.R.).
102. Rostow, supra note 101, at 676; see 15 U.S.C. § 1681b.
103. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.514 (2019); Rostow, supra note 101, at 676–77.
104. Pardau, supra note 99, at 81; see also Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113
Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C.).
105. Pardau, supra note 99, at 81; see 15 U.S.C. § 6801 (2018); Privacy of Consumer Financial
Information, 16 C.F.R. § 313 (2000).
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and allow consumers to opt out of sharing their data with third
parties.106
A significant law protecting the mode of transmitting data is the
Stored Communications Act (SCA).107 The SCA protects electronic
communications by prohibiting electronic communications providers
from disclosing such communications to nongovernmental third
parties without consent.
Because federal privacy laws are limited in scope, third parties
oftentimes use consumer data in unexpected and nonconsensual ways.
For example, HIPAA does not protect user-generated health
information, since it only applies to specific entities, such as hospitals
or health insurance companies.108 Accordingly, HIPAA does not
protect medical information collected from a Fitbit or Apple Watch,
since these data are generated by the user, rather than a medical
provider, and are thus not subject to HIPAA protections.109 Similarly,
the SCA does not protect location data collected from cell phones,
even though the SCA protects communications made from those same
devices.110 Further, the SCA does not cover posts or comments made
on social media, despite these being a form of electronic
communication.111 Thus, this “patchwork” of federal privacy law
leaves many gaps for consumers’ data to be exploited.
b. Agency protections
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) serves as the primary
authority to regulate privacy and data security, but without any
comprehensive federal privacy laws, its enforcement authority is
limited.112 Nevertheless, the FTC has a broad regulatory scope that
106. Rostow, supra note 101, at 677.
107. See 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2018).
108. Rebecca Lipman, Online Privacy and the Invisible Market for Our Data, 120 PENN ST. L.
REV. 777, 788 (2016); 45 C.F.R. § 160.103(4)(iv).
109. Lipman, supra note 108, at 788.
110. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 2701; Valentino-DeVries et al., supra note 31 (“There is no
federal law limiting the collection or use of [location] data.”).
111. Rostow, supra note 101, at 678.
112. See Lipman, supra note 108, at 789, 792; see also Woodrow Hartzog & Daniel J. Solove,
The Scope and Potential of FTC Data Protection, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 2230, 2231, 2236, 2273
(2015) (“The FTC’s endorsement of a diluted version of [Fair Information Practices] is one reason
that the Commission is not a good candidate to serve a larger role in privacy policy. The
Commission’s privacy vision is too limited.” (alteration in original) (quoting Robert Gellman, A
Better Way to Approach Privacy in the United States: Establish a Non-Regulatory Privacy
Protection Board, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1183, 1205 (2003)).
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covers most industries that involve consumers and that handle
consumers’ personal data.113 The FTC derives its authority from
section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, which prohibits
“unfair or deceptive acts or practices.”114 Further, the legislative
history of section 5 indicates an intent that the FTC’s authority be
evolutionary and wide-reaching,115 which allows the agency to
respond to cybercrime’s constantly changing nature.
However, the FTC’s authority is hindered by a number of judicial
carve-outs, such as exemptions for banks, common carriers, and notfor-profit institutions.116 These exemptions were created by Congress
in 1914, before digital privacy was ever a concern. Although the FTC
is a powerful agency, it has a limited ability to address such privacy
concerns.117 This is because the FTC regulates relationships between
companies and the consumers with whom they interact.118 Since thirdparty aggregators do not directly interact with consumers, they lack
opportunity to deceive consumers, and thus are not subject to FTC
regulation.119 Additionally, there is also the risk that large, institutional
companies may ignore FTC guidelines by flagrantly handling
consumer data because they consider FTC fines to be simply the cost
of doing business.120
2. Existing California Privacy Law
California has long been an established leader in online privacy
and has passed legislation with nationwide impact.121 For example, in
2003, California became the first state to enact a data breach
notification law.122 This law served as a model for the forty-six other
states that have since enacted similar data breach notification laws.123
113. See Hartzog & Solove, supra note 112, at 2236.
114. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2018); Lipman, supra note 108, at 789.
115. Hartzog & Solove, supra note 112, at 2246.
116. Id. at 2236, 2289.
117. See Lipman, supra note 108, at 792.
118. Id. at 792–93.
119. Id. at 793.
120. See Emily Stewart, A $5 Billion Fine from the FTC Is Huge—Unless You’re Facebook,
VOX (Apr. 25, 2019, 2:20 PM), https://www.vox.com/2019/4/25/18516301/facebook-earnings-ftcfine-mark-zuckerberg-stock.
121. Lipman, supra note 108, at 793; CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22575(a) (Deering 2020)
(requiring that any website that collects personally identifiable information post a privacy policy
on its website. Because this law applies to any website accessible to Californians, it effectively
requires that any U.S. website post a privacy policy).
122. HARRIS, supra note 52, at 1, app. C.
123. Id.
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Nevertheless, gaps in California law remain because, even though
California has more than one hundred different privacy laws, the focus
of these laws is limited to content, potential victims, and modality.124
3. European Union General Data Protection Regulation
In contrast to the United States, the European Union enacted a
comprehensive privacy law in 2018—the General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR).125 The GDPR considers individual privacy
protection to be a basic human right, and, at the time it was enacted,
the GDPR was the world’s toughest data privacy law.126 The GDPR
allows citizens to request access to their online data and restricts how
businesses can obtain and handle such data.127 Further, the GDPR
affords European citizens with the “Right to erasure” or the “right to
be forgotten,”128 meaning that individuals can demand that companies
delete their personal data.129
The GDPR’s scope is not limited to European businesses and
applies to any “controller or processor” of personal data that offers
goods or services to data subjects in the European Union, regardless
of where the processing takes place.130 This world-wide scope also
encompasses businesses that monitor the behavior of Europeans, so
long as the behavior takes place within the Union.131 The widereaching GDPR served as the model for legislators when drafting the
CCPA.132

124. Pardau, supra note 99, at 88–89.
125. Id. at 83–85; Adam Satariano, G.D.P.R., a New Privacy Law, Makes Europe World’s
Leading Tech Watchdog, N.Y. TIMES (May 24, 2018),https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/24/tech
nology/europe-gdpr-privacy.html?action=click&module=RelatedCoverage&pgtype=Article
&region=Footer; see also Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal
Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data
Protection Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1 [hereinafter GDPR].
126. Tony Raval, Data Privacy as a Basic Human Right, FORBES (Nov. 12, 2019, 9:00 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2019/11/12/data-privacy-as-a-basic-humanright/?sh=cdd8b574cbf3.
127. Satariano, supra note 125.
128. GDPR, supra note 125, art. 17, at 43–44.
129. Satariano, supra note 125.
130. GDPR, supra note 125, art. 3, at 32–33.
131. Id.
132. Erin Winick, California’s New Online Privacy Law Could Be Huge for the US, MIT TECH.
REV. (June 29, 2018), https://www.technologyreview.com/f/611570/californias-new-onlineprivacy-law-could-be-huge-for-the-us/.
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C. California Consumer Privacy Act
The CCPA has the potential to not only strengthen digital privacy
rights—it may also change the marketplace for consumer data. The
CCPA’s purpose is to provide consumers with greater control over
their personal information. This purpose reflects a critical step towards
creating a framework in which consumer data have tangible monetary
value, and a system where consumers have the ability to actually profit
from their own personal data.133 Despite these possibilities, the law
contains a number of significant issues that could inhibit its potential
impacts on digital privacy rights and data ownership. Even with these
issues, the CCPA creates new consumer rights and could ultimately
lead the way towards improved digital privacy.
1. History of the CCPA
a. Ballot initiative
In early 2018, the Californians for Consumer Privacy group
garnered more than six hundred thousand signatures to support their
proposed new privacy law, the Consumer Right to Privacy Act of
2018.134 This group was founded by a Bay Area real estate developer,
who was concerned about data privacy and spent approximately $3
million of his own money to fund the Californians for Consumer
Privacy ballot initiative.135 California lawmakers did not want to risk
voters passing that ballot initiative because, once passed into law, it
would be extremely difficult for the legislature to change it.136 This is
because, once a ballot initiative is passed into law, amendments may
only be made through additional ballot initiatives.137 In a rushed effort
to prevent the initiative from making it to the November ballot,

133. S. JUDICIARY COMM., ANALYSIS OF ASSEMBLY BILL NO. 375, 2017–2018 Reg. Sess., at
18–19 (Cal. 2018).
134. Issie Lapowsky, California Unanimously Passes Historic Privacy Bill, WIRED (June 28,
2018, 5:57 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/california-unanimously-passes-historic-privacybill/.
135. Goldman, An Introduction to the CCPA, supra note 6, at 1.
136. Kristen J. Mathews & Courtney M. Bowman, The California Consumer Privacy Act of
2018, PROSKAUER ROSE LLP: PRIV. L. BLOG (July 13, 2018), https://privacylaw.proskauer.com/
2018/07/articles/data-privacy-laws/the-california-consumer-privacy-act-of-2018/.
137. Id.
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California lawmakers unanimously passed a substitute bill, the
California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 (AB 375).138
b. Legislative history and intent
The legislative history of the CCPA notes that “[t]he world’s most
valuable resource is no longer oil, but data.”139 The Senate Judiciary
Committee for the CCPA realized the value of data after the
Cambridge Analytica scandal, which was the impetus for passing the
law.140 The Cambridge Analytica scandal revealed that a political
consulting firm had harvested data on fifty million Facebook users,
without those users’ knowledge or consent. 141 Aside from the political
implications of that scandal, it exposed technology companies’
widespread collection of user data and raised the public’s awareness
of consumer privacy.142
In addition to the Cambridge Analytica scandal, the growing
public demand for online privacy was also stoked by “surreptitious
surveillance” of civilians.143 As of 2019, most Americans felt that it
was impossible to “go through daily life without being tracked” or
having their data collected.144 With the Internet of Things (IoT)145
becoming a greater part of daily life, technology manufacturers and
service providers are able to track, store, and sell data covering a wide
variety of formerly private consumer behavior.146 IoT products create
“a network of connected devices” and include items such as “smart”
thermostats, security cameras, internet-enabled washing machines,
and more.147 Further, in 2019, most Americans reported feeling that
they have little to no control over how companies use their personal

138. John Stephens, California Consumer Privacy Act, A.B.A. (Feb. 14, 2019),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/committee_newsletters/bcl/2019/
201902/fa_9/; Lapowsky, supra note 134.
139. S. JUDICIARY COMM., ANALYSIS OF ASSEMBLY BILL NO. 375, 2017–2018 Reg. Sess., at
1 (Cal. 2018).
140. Id.
141. Issie Lapowsky, Cambridge Analytica Took 50M Facebook Users’ Data—and Both
Companies Owe Answers, WIRED (Mar. 17, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/cambridgeanalytica-50m-facebook-users-data/.
142. ANALYSIS OF ASSEMBLY BILL NO. 375, at 1.
143. Id.; Lapowsky, supra note 134.
144. PEW RSCH. CTR. REPORT, supra note 53, at 2.
145. Stacy-Ann Elvy, Paying for Privacy and the Personal Data Economy, 117 COLUM. L.
REV. 1369, 1372 (2017).
146. Id. at 1372–73.
147. Id. at 1372.
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information.148 The CCPA was a direct response to these concerns and
was intended to provide consumers with new privacy rights, so that
they can to take back control over their personal information.149
2. New Consumer Rights
The CCPA affords consumers new statutory rights to control their
personal information, and in 2020, it is considered the toughest data
privacy law in the United States.150 New consumer rights under the
CCPA fit primarily within three main categories: the right to know;
the right to delete; and the right to opt out.151 First, under the “right to
know,” consumers may request that a business disclose details about
what personal information is collected—specifically, what categories
of personal information, what sources were used to collect the
information, for what purpose, and with whom the information is
shared.152 Second, under the “right to delete,” businesses must delete
any personal information collected from that consumer upon a verified
consumer request.153 Third, under the “right to opt-out,” consumers
have the right to direct a business not to sell their personal
information.154 Additionally, businesses must notify consumers of this
right by including a “Do Not Sell My Personal Information” link on
their homepage.155
Further, the CCPA offers a potential mechanism for consumers to
make money from selling their personal data. Under section 1798.125,
the financial incentive section of the CCPA, consumers can actually
participate in the sale of their own data because a “business may offer
financial incentives, including payments to consumers as
compensation, for the collection of personal information, the sale of
personal information, or the deletion of personal information.”156

148. PEW RSCH. CTR. REPORT, supra note 53, at 2.
149. See Lapowsky, supra note 134.
150. E.g., Stephens, supra note 138.
151. See Fact Sheet, Att’y Gen., Cal. Dep’t of Just., California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA):
Fact Sheet 1 (Oct. 10, 2019), https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/attachments/press_releases/CCPA%2
0Fact%20Sheet%20%2800000002%29.pdf (also including the right to non-discrimination, which
prohibits companies from discriminating against consumers that exercise their right to opt-out).
152. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.110(a) (Deering 2020).
153. Id. § 1798.105(a).
154. Id. § 1798.120(a).
155. Id. §§ 1798.135, .120.
156. Id. § 1798.125(b)(1); Assemb. B. 1355, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019).
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In addition to these new rights, the CCPA creates a private right
of action, by which consumers can seek damages if their personal
information is exposed due to a business’s failure to “implement and
maintain reasonable security procedures and practices.”157 However,
prior to bringing suit for statutory damages, a consumer must first
notify the business in writing of the violation and provide for a thirtyday cure period.158
3. Business Obligations
The CCPA imposes new obligations upon any company doing
business in California that collects consumer information and that
meets any one of the following requirements: (1) company’s gross
annual revenues are greater than $25 million; or (2) if the company
“annually buys, receives for the business’s commercial purposes,
sells, or shares for commercial purposes, alone or in combination, the
personal information of 50,000 or more consumers, households, or
devices”; or (3) if 50 percent or greater of company’s annual revenues
are derived from selling consumers’ personal information.159
Although the CCPA was born from internet-based data breaches, it
applies equally to both online and offline businesses.160 The CCPA is
so wide-reaching that essentially all businesses will fall within its
regulation.161 Although not all businesses generate annual revenues
greater than $25 million, most businesses, even small business, receive
the personal information of more than 50 thousand consumers.162 This
is a low threshold, since a business would only need to process 137
unique credit card sales per day in order to receive the personal
information of 50 thousand consumers annually.163
The CCPA’s expansive application is the source of much
criticism because it will likely impact small businesses
disproportionately, even though the law was intended to address the
abusive privacy practices of large technology companies, such as
Facebook and Google.164 The California Department of Justice’s
157. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.150(a)(1).
158. Id. § 1798.150(b).
159. Id. § 1798.140(c)(1).
160. Id. § 1798.145; Goldman, An Introduction to the CCPA, supra note 6, at 2.
161. See Goldman, An Introduction to the CCPA, supra note 6, at 2.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Eric Goldman, The California Consumer Privacy Act Should Be Condemned, Not
Celebrated (Cross-Post), TECH. & MKTG. L. BLOG (Aug. 9, 2018),
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Standardized Regulatory Impact Assessment estimated that CCPA
compliance costs will range between $467 million and almost $16.5
billion between 2020 and 2030.165 These initial compliance costs are
primarily attributable to operational costs required to establish
compliance plans, and costs to develop technological systems that
respond to the CCPA and consumer requests to delete or stop selling
their personal information.166
Smaller companies, with fewer than twenty employees, are
expected to incur $50,000 in initial compliance costs, not including
any costs associated with anticipated litigation.167 Companies with
more than 500 employees are expected to incur an initial cost of $2
million.168 However, large technology companies are likely better
equipped to handle the cost of CCPA compliance and anticipated
litigation, whereas small businesses may not be able to shoulder such
costs.169 As a result, small businesses may be required to either stop
offering “free” services or find other ways to pass along compliance
costs.170
Further, the CCPA contains a number of issues and unclear
definitions that could be exploited and ultimately undermine the law’s
overall purpose. For example, Facebook publicly stated in 2019 that it
will not need to change its web-tracking services to comply with the
CCPA since it does not fit the definition of “selling” data.171 The
CCPA’s definition of “sell” contains an exception for when personal
information is shared with a third-party “service provider” and is
“necessary to perform a business purpose.”172 Facebook’s web tracker,
Pixel, tracks users’ activity across the internet and then utilizes these

https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2018/08/the-california-consumer-privacy-act-should-becondemned-not-celebrated-cross-post.htm.
165. DAVID ROLAND-HOLST ET AL., BERKELEY ECON. ADVISING & RSCH., LLC,
STANDARDIZED REGULATORY IMPACT ASSESSMENT: CALIFORNIA CONSUMER PRIVACY ACT OF
2018 REGULATIONS 8 (2019), http://www.dof.ca.gov/Forecasting/Economics/Major_Regulations/
Major_Regulations_Table/documents/CCPA_Regulations-SRIA-DOF.pdf.
166. Id. at 24–25.
167. Id. at 11.
168. Id.
169. Goldman, The California Consumer Privacy Act Should Be Condemned, Not
Celebrated (Cross-Post), supra note 164.
170. Id.
171. Patience Haggin, Facebook Won’t Change Web Tracking in Response to California
Privacy Law, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 12, 2019, 1:29 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-wontchange-web-tracking-in-response-to-california-privacy-law-11576175345.
172. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(t)(2)(C) (Deering 2020).
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data for targeted advertising.173 Although privacy experts dispute
Facebook’s interpretation of the CCPA, Facebook’s argument
nevertheless illustrates how the CCPA’s unclear definitions can be
exploited by the very companies the law was directed at.174
III. ANALYSIS
Existing data privacy law does little to balance the scales of
power, in that consumers have little control over their personal data
and the companies collecting, profiting from, and holding these data,
may govern the terms of this relationship as they wish.175 Although
the CCPA makes strides in data privacy, it mostly stays within the
“control-based regime of ‘notice and choice,’” where users are
presented with long, unreadable disclosures and given the option to
opt out of sharing personal data.176 Such an arrangement imposes
onerous obligations on businesses and does little to promote a
mutually beneficial relationship between businesses and the
consumers who provide valuable personal data.
To strengthen data privacy and reform the relationship between
custodians of data and those who produce it, some legal scholars have
proposed that companies who collect, analyze, and sell personal data
for profit be considered “information fiduciaries.”177 Other models
propose regulating data as property or even as labor.178
Although the CCPA does not create a framework to accommodate
these proposed models, it does assign monetary value to consumer
data and contains language that could facilitate compensating users for
collection and sale of their data. It remains to be seen whether this
feature of the CCPA will be utilized and whether it will have a material
impact on consumer data privacy. Additionally, the CCPA is not
clearly written and generally creates much uncertainty for businesses.
173. Sara Morrison, Facebook Is Gearing Up for a Battle with California’s New Data Privacy
Law, VOX (Dec. 17, 2019, 5:00 PM), https://www.vox.com/recode/2019/12/17/21024366/facebo
ok-ccpa-pixel-web-tracker.
174. Id.
175. Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously in Privacy Law, 19 STAN.
TECH. L. REV. 431, 434 (2016) (noting that “modern American privacy law encourages companies
to profit in short-sighted ways by extracting as much value as possible from personal data in the
short term”).
176. Id.
177. Lina M. Khan & David E. Pozen, A Skeptical View of Information Fiduciaries, 133 HARV.
L. REV. 497, 499 (2019).
178. Ritter & Mayer, supra note 97, at 227; Eric Posner & Glen Weyl, Data Workers of the
World, Unite!, PROMARKET (Apr. 25, 2018), https://promarket.org/data-workers-world-unite/.
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Ultimately, the CCPA’s issues risk overshadowing the law’s ability to
facilitate consumer data monetization. The ability for consumers to
profit from their own data is critical to disrupting the existing
paradigm. So, despite its flaws and many issues, the CCPA is an
important step towards creating a system in which consumers truly
control their own data.
A. Beyond Privacy and Valuing Personal Data: Monetizing
Personal Data
Public recognition concerning the large-scale collection and
monetization of personal data has generated interest in policy reforms
and new paradigms for data exchange.179 Companies earn enormous
amounts of money from using and selling consumer data, which were
freely provided by consumers, yet these companies fail to serve as
responsible custodians of such data. Additionally, consumers are not
compensated for the valuable resource that they generate, nor are they
paid for the near-constant surveillance that such pervasive data
collection imposes.180
If consumers were able to earn money by selling their own data,
rather than the technology companies collecting and selling it without
user consent, the power dynamic of the existing digital advertising
ecosystem would dramatically change. If consumers were able to
control and sell their own data, they would have a vested financial
interest in the protection of their personal information. For that reason,
consumers would be financially invested in the safekeeping of their
data. Thus, consumer data monetization could increase the stakes of
data collection and incentivize companies to exercise greater security
practices.
Millions of people use services such as Facebook and Google
each day, generating data about their behavior that can be sold to be
used in advertising and to train artificial intelligence (AI) programs.181
Yet, consumers are not getting paid for this contribution and have very
little control over its use. Further, data privacy legislation does not
179. See Dylan Walsh, How Much Is Your Private Data Worth—and Who Should Own It?,
STAN. GRADUATE SCH. BUS. (Sept. 19, 2018), https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/insights/how-muchyour-private-data-worth-who-should-own-it.
180. See Valentino-DeVries et al., supra note 31.
181. Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl, Want Our Personal Data? Pay for It, WALL ST. J.
(Apr. 20, 2018, 11:19 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/want-our-personal-data-pay-for-it1524237577.
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clarify who actually owns consumer data, even though such legislation
endeavors to improve consumer digital privacy and discourage
exploitative data collection practices.182 Moreover, data privacy
legislation does not outline a clear way in which consumers can earn
a slice of the profits made from selling their personal data.
1. Data as Property
Proponents of granting consumers ownership over their data, with
“the right to sell it or restrict its use,” say that such a model would
benefit society as a whole by encouraging innovation and improving
digital privacy.183 Data are different from other commodities in that
data do not diminish with use and can be used by different companies
or systems simultaneously.184 For example, an individuals’ personal
data can be used by different companies at the same time without
being depleted.185 This quality of being “infinitely usable” makes the
prospect of paying consumers for their data even more attractive.186
Additionally, because data are an “infinitely usable” resource,
consumers could be incentivized to maximize profits by sharing and
selling their data more broadly, thereby improving data sets for AI
and other uses.187 Thus, granting consumers an ownership interest in
their data could lead to greater societal gains.188
However, while consumer data possesses significant value on a
mass-scale, there is the question of whether individuals would profit
in a meaningful way from selling their own data. There are significant
concerns with disrupting the data marketplace and how this could
impact the way in which we use the internet.189 Currently, consumers
provide their data in exchange for free access to services.190 Even if
this is an imbalanced exchange, studies show that the public is
generally unwilling to pay for services that they currently get for

182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Ritter & Mayer, supra note 97, at 226–27.
Tonetti & Kerry, supra note 15.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
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free.191 Critics also note that owning data will “do little to help
consumers’ privacy—and may well leave them worse off.”192
Additionally, granting consumers a property interest in their own
data could create substantial difficulty for companies that use personal
information for basic business purposes. For example, this “data as a
property right” model could pose particular difficulty for businesses
that may not even sell consumer data, but must store them for purposes
such as providing customer service, complying with legal
requirements, and countless other legitimate business uses.193 Critics
predict that such a marketplace would disrupt the current free flow of
information and create substantial, if not insurmountable, technical
and logistical costs that would likely not be worth the small amount of
money that consumers could earn.194
Additionally, critics of the “data as property” model note that it
could actually make consumer privacy worse because consumers
would be incentivized to “click away rights to data in exchange for
convenience, free services . . . or other motivations.”195 Critics also
doubt the logistical feasibility of such a model, noting that any
increases in data exchange could be easily stymied by companies that
demand exclusive rights to the consumer data that they purchase.196
However, if an individual wishes to “click away [his or her]
rights,” that choice, to sell their data, should belong to the
consumer.197 Additionally, proponents of the data as property model
point out that any practical difficulties of changing the data
marketplace would be mitigated by innovation required to overcome
these challenges.198 Ultimately however, this model could lead to a
fairer economy and distribution of income, because more individuals
would have access to the same source of income—selling their own
data.199

191. Magali Eben, Market Definition and Free Online Services: The Prospect of Personal Data
as Price, 14 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y INFO. SOC’Y 227, 257 (2018).
192. Tonetti & Kerry, supra note 15.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. See id.
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2. Data as Labor
The question of whether consumers should be able to control and
sell their own data is not necessarily a binary inquiry. Consumers
should be able to profit from their own data without destroying the
entire data marketplace as we know it, while still increasing privacy
and shifting towards “data dignity.”200 Rather than considering
personal data a property right in all contexts, consumers could be paid
when such data are used for specific, defined purposes.
For example, when users interact with the internet, payment could
be required when their data are used as input for targeted advertising
and when it is used “as a means of building better algorithms to target
ads to others.”201 A number of startups are currently working towards
accomplishing this by creating a mechanism for consumers to reclaim
and secure their information, and then sell it to advertisers if they
wish.202 One program allows users to scrape their own data from thirdparty sources, such as from the health tracker Fitbit, anonymize these
data, and then sell them to third-party advertisers.203 Such information
can be used by retailers and marketing companies to target consumers
more efficiently and accurately, and match consumers with the best
promotion for each particular individual.204
This model is more consistent with the “data as labor” theory,
where consumers are encouraged to increase the quality and quantity
of data.205 The data as labor theory suggests that users or “data
laborers” organize into “data labor union[s]” in order to negotiate
contract terms and prices with the companies purchasing consumer
data.206 Such data unions could help to avoid potential issues seen with
the “data as property” model. This is because data unions would
increase consumers’ bargaining power and make companies less able
200. Jaron Lanier, You Should Get Paid for Your Data, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 23, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/video/opinion/100000006678020/data-privacy-jaron-lanier-2.html
(describing the concept of data dignity: “You should have the moral rights to every bit of data that
exists because you exist, now and forever.”).
201. Joshua Gans, Paying for Data, DIGITOPOLY (Sept. 23, 2019),
https://digitopoly.org/2019/09/23/paying-for-data/ (discussing Jaron Lanier’s video opinion piece
with the New York Times, Jaron Lanier Fixes the Internet).
202. Paul, supra note 43.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Arrieta-Ibarra et al., supra note 38, at 38, 40, 41; Tonetti & Kerry, supra note 15.
206. Arrieta-Ibarra et al., supra note 38, at 41; Posner & Weyl, Want Our Personal Data? Pay
for It, supra note 181.
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to demand strict data-exchange terms, such as exclusive rights to data
they purchased, which was a concern for the “data as property”
model.207 Given the interconnected objectives of the data as labor
theory, this model would likely be best accomplished by utilizing
decentralized networks and blockchain technology.
3. Blockchain’s Role in Data Monetization
Applications that collect users’ data use blockchain to store the
data in an encrypted, decentralized network, only sharing such data
with explicit user consent.208 Advertisers can purchase a key to
decrypt the individual’s data and use these data to target specific users,
either the individual user or others.209 Such blockchain technology
places greater control in the hands of consumers “by removing the
middleman from facilitating transactions.”210 Accordingly, blockchain
has “the potential to democratize the sharing and monetization of data
and analytics” because it empowers consumers to truly control their
own data.211
Many data marketplace startups are already using blockchain
technology, which may be integral to consumers truly gaining control
over their own data. Blockchain is “an open, distributed ledger that
can record transactions between two parties efficiently and in a
verifiable and permanent way.”212 Storing data in decentralized
servers by using blockchain models puts consumers in control over
their own data, since no single company or other individual would
have sole license to it.213 Rather, consumers literally hold the keys to
unlock their personal data and thus maintain control over their use.214
Additionally, the decentralized nature of blockchain offers improved
cybersecurity and helps to ensure that user data remains
confidential.215
207. Tonetti & Kerry, supra note 15.
208. Paul, supra note 43.
209. Id.
210. Chris Neimeth, What Can Be Uncovered When Big Data Meets the Blockchain,
INFO WORLD (June 29, 2017, 9:27 AM), https://www.infoworld.com/article/3203748/what-can-beuncovered-when-big-data-meets-the-blockchain.html.
211. Id.
212. Marco Iansiti & Karim R. Lakhani, The Truth About Blockchain, HARV. BUS. REV. (Jan.–
Feb. 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/01/the-truth-about-blockchain.
213. Paul, supra note 43.
214. Id.
215. See Phillip Shaverdian, Comment, Start with Trust: Utilizing Blockchain to Resolve the
Third-Party Data Breach Problem, 66 UCLA L. REV. 1242, 1275–76 (2019).
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However, the use of blockchain technology is not entirely without
issue. There is no legislation that currently regulates blockchain
technology, nor are there commonly adopted standards for writing
transactions in blockchain.216 Blockchain technology could also
fundamentally conflict with the CCPA, which requires that user data
be deleted on request, since blockchain ledgers are immutable by
nature.217 Additionally, there is a concern regarding the scalability of
blockchain, given that it is a relatively new technology.218
Nevertheless, the cybersecurity benefits of blockchain technology and
its ability to provide users with greater agency and control over their
own data likely outweigh its potential issues.
B. The CCPA and Data Monetization: Facilitating Data
Monetization
The CCPA is a landmark law for consumer rights and could
represent a step towards disrupting the existing data-exchange model
of providing data for free services.219 Although the CCPA does not
provide consumers with absolute ownership over their own data, it
nevertheless provides consumers with significantly greater control
over how their personal information is collected and used.220 In doing
so, the CCPA also creates a mechanism for consumers to monetize
their personal information.
Unlike prior privacy legislation in the United States, the CCPA
acknowledges the monetary value of user data. The CCPA does not
only enable consumers to determine whether their data are sold to third
parties, but it also permits companies to compensate consumers for the
collection and sale of personal information.221 It remains to be seen
whether companies will actually offer financial incentives to
consumers to collect and sell the consumers’ personal information.
Nevertheless, the CCPA is a step towards consumers having the ability
216. Peter Bendor-Samuel, The Primary Challenge to Blockchain Technology, FORBES
(May 23, 2017, 10:59 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/peterbendorsamuel/2017/05/23/theprimary-challenge-to-blockchain-technology/#1a5a8ef32aba.
217. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.105(a) (Deering 2020); Shaverdian, supra note 215, at 1287
(noting that blockchain technology could conflict with the GDPR).
218. Bendor-Samuel, supra note 216.
219. See Khan & Pozen, supra note 177, at 503.
220. See Greg Bensinger, So Far, Under California’s New Privacy Law, Firms Are Disclosing
Too Little Data—or Far too Much, WASH. POST (Jan. 21, 2020, 4:44 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/01/21/ccpa-transparency/.
221. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100, .125.
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to profit from their digital labor and towards consumers gaining
greater agency and ownership over their personal information.
The CCPA acknowledges the monetary value of personal data in
two ways: by assigning a specific dollar amount to personal
identifying information when it is exposed in a breach; and by
authorizing a scheme by which businesses can pay consumers for the
right to collect and sell their personal information.222
1. Private Right of Action
A significant feature of the CCPA is that it allows consumers to
recover following a data breach, even if the exposure of their data did
not result in financial harm.223 Despite the increasing frequency of
large data breaches, consumers have generally faced a number of legal
hurdles when bringing suit after a breach.224 Much of this difficulty is
because plaintiffs must establish Article III standing in order to litigate
in federal court.225
To establish Article III standing, plaintiffs must demonstrate that
they have suffered an “injury in fact,” which is “concrete and
particularized,” “actual or imminent,” and that is fairly traceable to the
actions of the defendant and redressable by a favorable judgment of a
federal court.226 However, data breaches often do not result in an
immediate financial harm, which makes it difficult to demonstrate that
an injury is “actual or imminent.”227 Consequently, consumers face a
considerable barrier to recovery if their data was exposed in a breach,
because without a legally recognizable harm, they lack Article III
standing.228
The CCPA addresses this issue and affirmatively provides
consumers with the right to sue following a data breach, regardless of
whether they suffered a financial harm as a result.229 Thus, consumers
need not wait to recover until a third party uses their illicitly accessed
222. Id. §§ 1798.125(b)(1), .150(a)(1)(A); Assemb. B. 1355, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019).
223. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.150(a)(1).
224. Gregory S. Gaglione, Jr., Comment, The Equifax Data Breach: An Opportunity to Improve
Consumer Protection and Cybersecurity Efforts in America, 67 BUFF. L. REV. 1133, 1134 (2019).
225. Clara Kim, Note, Granting Standing in Data Breach Cases: The Seventh Circuit Paves
the Way Towards a Solution to the Increasingly Pervasive Data Breach Problem, 2016 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 544, 557.
226. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).
227. Solove & Citron, supra note 90, at 752.
228. Kim, supra note 225, at 557–58.
229. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.150(a)(1) (Deering 2020).
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data to commit financial fraud.230 The law provides that “[a]ny
consumer whose nonencrypted and nonredacted personal
information . . . is subject to an unauthorized access and exfiltration,
theft, or disclosure as a result of the business’s violation of the duty to
implement and maintain reasonable security procedures and practices”
may bring suit to recover damages no less than $100, but no more than
$750.231
In providing statutory damages, regardless of financial injury, the
CCPA recognizes that data exposure is the harm.232 Further, providing
statutory damages in the absence of financial injury acknowledges that
consumer data are inherently valuable. However, the CCPA does not
assign a high value to these data, since consumers may only recover
between $100 and $750 without proving actual damages.233
Additionally, the inherent value of data is weakened by the
CCPA’s cure period.234 The CCPA requires that, “prior to initiating
any action against a business for statutory damages on an individual
or class-wide basis, a consumer provide[] a business [with] 30 days’
written notice identifying the specific provisions of this title the
consumer alleges have been or are being violated.”235 If a company
cures the violation within thirty days, then an individual or class of
consumers may no longer bring suit.236
However, a cure period may not offer an adequate solution, since
data illicitly accessed via a breach can be “replicated and transmitted
instantaneously and without limit.”237 In fact, a failed amendment to
the CCPA, Senate Bill 561, proposed eliminating the cure period
entirely because it “incentivizes companies to break the law as a
business decision, on the theory that fixing a violation will cost less
than complying with the law in the first instance.”238 Further, the
language of the cure period suggests that a company would only need
230. See id.
231. Id. § 1798.150(a)(1)(A); Assemb. B. 1355, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019).
232. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.150.
233. Id. § 1798.150(a)(1)(A).
234. S. JUDICIARY COMM., ANALYSIS OF SENATE BILL NO. 561, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess., at 3
(Cal. 2019).
235. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.150(b).
236. Id.
237. Will Oremus, Why Facebook Isn’t Helping Its Users Who Got Hacked, SLATE (Oct. 24,
2018, 3:42 PM), https://slate.com/technology/2018/10/facebook-data-breach-2018-victimscybersecurity.html.
238. ANALYSIS OF SENATE BILL NO. 561, at 7.
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to cure the individual violation, rather than provide a cure to all
affected individuals.239 The law also does not define “cure,” which
makes it difficult to determine what would be considered a solution
sufficient to bar future lawsuits.240
Despite the low statutory damages and the potentially
problematic cure period, the CCPA nevertheless acknowledges that a
breach is a harm in and of itself.241 In order for consumers to monetize
their personal data, the value of this personal information must be
untangled from its utility to fraudsters, and such personal information
must be considered inherently valuable, whether or not it is used to
commit financial fraud. The CCPA does just this by providing
statutory damages to victims of data breaches that expose
nonencrypted and nonredacted personal information, even if this
information is not later used to commit identity theft.242
2. Financial Incentives for Personal Data
The CCPA further acknowledges that personal data have value
beyond providing a means for criminals to access consumers’ bank
accounts for identity theft. The CCPA notes that a “business may offer
financial incentives, including payments to consumers as
compensation, for the collection of personal information, the sale of
personal information, or the deletion of personal information.”243
Despite existing privacy legislation, consumers still have very
little ownership over their own data. The patchwork of existing
privacy laws is unable to keep pace with technological developments
and emerging risks, and also does not provide any framework for
consumers to actually earn money from the immense amount of data
that are collected from their normal internet usage. Although the
CCPA provides a mechanism through which consumers can profit
from their own data, it fails to define a clear structure for them to do
so.

239. Lukas Sosnicki & Ashley R. Fickel, February 27, 2019, CCPA Webinar Q&As: Private
Claims Under the CCPA, THE FIREWALL: BLOG (Feb. 27, 2019), https://www.thefirewallblog.com/2019/07/february-27-2019-ccpa-webinar-qas-private-claims-under-the-ccpa/.
240. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.150.
241. See id.
242. Id. § 1798.150(a)(1)(A); Assemb. B. 1355, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019).
243. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.125(b)(1); Assemb. B. 1355.
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C. Alternative Framework
The CCPA gives a consumer the ability to direct businesses to
both delete any personal information the business has collected on that
consumer and to stop selling these data to a third party.244 However,
rather than create a presumption of digital privacy, the CCPA “optout” paradigm is entirely reliant on individuals’ “privacy selfmanagement.”245 Further, this opt-out structure diminishes any
incentive for companies to pay consumers for their data, and thus,
reduces the likelihood that consumers will monetize their own data in
a meaningful way.
Previously, consumers had little control over how their data were
used. Although the CCPA is a large improvement for digital privacy
rights, the practical realities of an opt-out framework may prevent
these rights from being widely exercised.246 This is because the
process for opting-out is cumbersome and time consuming, such that
it could critically undermine the ultimate goal of the CCPA, which is
to improve digital privacy.
For example, if a consumer does not want his or her personal
information sold to third parties, that consumer would first need to
contact at least 150 data brokers individually to request that the data
brokers delete their personal information.247 Then, the consumer
would need to contact any website or digital service that he or she had
previously used to individually opt out of selling his or her personal
data. The number of steps consumers must take to opt out of having
their data sold is deeply problematic. Although consumers want
greater digital privacy, they are generally averse to managing it
themselves and “have a strong preference to avoid thinking about
privacy in the first place.”248
244. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.105, 1798.120.
245. Daniel J. Solove, The Myth of the Privacy Paradox, 89 GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming
2021).
246. See id. (while discussing the scalability of the CCPA, Solove compares the opting-out
process to being “like trying to empty the ocean by taking out a few cups of water”).
247. See Sure, You Can Have Your Data . . . After Reaching Out to 150 Brokers, MARKETPLACE
(Jan. 27, 2020), https://www.marketplace.org/shows/marketplace-tech/sure-you-can-have-yourdata-after-reaching-out-to-150-brokers/.
248. Charlie Warzel, You Care More About Your Privacy Than You Think, N.Y. TIMES
(June 11, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/11/opinion/privacy-facebook-sexting.html;
Dan Svirsky, Why Are Privacy Preferences Inconsistent? 14–15 (June 26, 2018) (unpublished
paper), http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/fellows_papers/pdf/Svirsky_81_revisio
n.pdf.
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Under the CCPA, consumers, by default, consent to the sale of
their personal information if they do not affirmatively opt out.249
Companies that sell consumer information benefit from the opt-out
framework, because very few consumers may actually exercise the
option to opt out due to inconvenience or unawareness of this option.
Thus, if few consumers actually opt out of selling their data,
companies have little reason to offer financial incentives to those
consumers who do consent to having their data sold.
Alternatively, an “opt-in” framework could improve consumers
digital privacy and improve the likelihood that businesses would
exercise their option to offer financial incentives to consumers to sell
their personal information. An opt-in paradigm requires that a
consumer affirmatively provide consent before businesses may sell
that consumer’s personal information.250 Such a mechanism could
help shift the balance of power from companies to the individuals and
potentially incentivize businesses to create data sharing practices that
consumers would want to consent to.251
By shifting the power dynamic and incentivizing companies to
compensate consumers for their data, an opt-in framework could
greatly improve the likelihood that consumers could actually earn
meaningful money from selling their own data. If companies, by
default, could not sell users’ personal information, those companies
would be incentivized to offer financial benefits to consumers that opt
in to selling their data.
However, such an opt-in system is still not without its potential
downsides. An opt-in paradigm could upset the data marketplace and
have serious economic impacts.252 Critics of an opt-in framework
argue that requiring consent for data collection would hinder
innovation by reducing the size and diversity of available data sets.253
Additionally, an opt-in structure would impact advertising-based
249. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.115(d), .120, .135; Brian Barrett, Hey, Apple! ‘Opt Out’ Is
Useless. Let People Opt In, WIRED (Aug. 2, 2019), https://www.wired.com/story/hey-apple-optout-is-useless/.
250. Barrett, supra note 249.
251. Id.
252. See Daniel Castro, How an “Opt-In” Privacy Regime Would Undermine the Internet
Ecosystem, INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND. (May 26, 2017), https://itif.org/publications/201
7/05/26/how-opt-in-privacy-regime-would-undermine-internet-ecosystem.
253. Polina Arsentyeva, It’s 2019, So Why Are We Still Talking About Opt-In Consent?, INT’L
ASS’N OF PRIV. PROS. (Nov. 12, 2019), https://iapp.org/news/a/its-2019-so-why-are-we-stilltalking-about-opt-in-consent/.
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online business models, particularly those businesses that fund “free”
online services by selling consumer data for targeted advertising.254
However, these concerns may be exaggerated. Even if the CCPA
was modified such that consumers would consent to having their data
sold rather than opt out, as it is currently, websites could still use
digital advertising to fund free services, just not targeted or behavioral
advertising. An opt-in framework would not preclude businesses from
selling general advertising space on their websites but would require
user consent for targeted behavioral advertising.255 Although the
market for targeted advertising exceeds $20 billion, there is limited
support that targeted advertising is actually more effective than nontargeted advertising.256 The GDPR utilizes an opt-in structure and
illustrates that requiring consumers to opt in to sharing and selling
their data does not necessarily lead to catastrophic economic results.257
IV. CONCLUSION
The CCPA has created an immense amount of uncertainty and
excitement, and its impacts may be felt across the entire California
economy.258 However, structural issues with the CCPA may result in
low consumer engagement and undermine material improvements to
consumer cybersecurity. The new law, although targeted at data
brokers and large technology companies, is written in such a way that
it will apply to almost all industries.259 Further, due to the law’s
cumbersome opt-out framework, the benefits of the CCPA—to
provide a means by which consumers can monetize their own data—
may not be realized and may ultimately be overlooked. These issues
254. ALAN MCQUINN & DANIEL CASTRO, INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND., A GRAND
BARGAIN ON DATA PRIVACY LEGISLATION IN AMERICA 5 (2019), http://www2.itif.org/2019grand-bargain-privacy.pdf.
255. See Jessica Davies, After GDPR, the New York Times Cut Off Ad Exchanges in Europe—
and Kept Growing Ad Revenue, DIGIDAY (Jan. 16, 2019), https://digiday.com/media/gumgumtestnew-york-times-gdpr-cut-off-ad-exchanges-europe-ad-revenue/ (discussing the impacts of the
GDPR, which reduced behavioral targeted advertising).
256. Valentino-DeVries et al., supra note 31; Natasha Lomas, Targeted Ads Offer Little Extra
Value for Online Publishers, Study Suggests, TECHCRUNCH (May 31, 2019, 9:09 AM),
https://techcrunch.com/2019/05/31/targeted-ads-offer-little-extra-value-for-online-publishersstudy-suggests.
257. See, e.g., Davies, supra note 255.
258. Eric Goldman, Some Lessons Learned from the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA),
18 Months in (Part 2 of 3), TECH. & MKTG. L. BLOG (Dec. 17, 2019), https://blog.ericgoldman.or
g/archives/2019/12/some-lessons-learned-from-the-california-consumer-privacy-act-ccpa-18months-in-part-2-of-3.htm.
259. Id.
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have not been addressed via any of the recent amendments to the
CCPA, which have mostly failed to make any significant changes to
the law.260
Nevertheless, the law is not beyond repair and because the CCPA
assigns value to consumer data, it signals a tide change in consumer
privacy. The CCPA helps to create a system that places consumers in
greater control of their own data, such that “[n]o company is entitled
to data; they are entrusted with it.”261 By requiring that companies
disclose how consumer data are used and with whom such data are
shared, the CCPA helps to provide consumers with the information
necessary to make informed choices and to hold companies
accountable.262 Further, enabling consumers to sell their own data
increases the likelihood that consumers will, in fact, hold companies
accountable, since these data will have actual monetary value. Thus,
while imperfect, the CCPA may indicate momentum towards a
paradigm where companies are merely the custodians, not the owners,
of consumer data.

260. Tanya Forsheit, And at the End of the Day, the CCPA Remains Very Much the Same (Guest
Blog Post), TECH. & MKTG. L. BLOG (Sept. 16, 2019), https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/201
9/09/and-at-the-end-of-the-day-the-ccpa-remains-very-much-the-same-guest-blog-post.htm.
261. Fredrick Lee, CCPA Won’t Be Enough to Fix Tech’s Data Entitlement Problem,
TECH CRUNCH (Feb. 7, 2020, 12:09 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2020/02/07/ccpa-wont-beenough-to-fix-techs-data-entitlement-problem/.
262. Id.; CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.100 (Deering 2020).
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